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A. Joesef University, Szeged 
» The Concept of Secret 
The ordinary use of "secret" is so diverse that it covers a 
vast field of meaning; to narrow it we can turn to the dictionary 
and use ite definitions as a starting point. In this case we 
necessarily neglect some particular occurances of the word as a 
, lexical items though at the same time we presume t{iat they eould 
be classifier into the following two definitions. 
The Oxfords English Dictionary * gives seven separate 
definitions of the word "secret" as a substantive; among them two 
are very particular (2. a prayer in liturgical use, 7. a coat of 
mail), two others do no more than specifiy things that can be the 
object of secret (4. a method, 5» • place), one lists only 
different phrases made with the word "secret", while the 
remaining two reveal the basic meanings of "secret" at onoe 
interrelated and contrasting: 
1. Something unknown or unrevealed or that is known only 
by initiation or revelation, a mystery chiefly pi. the hidden 
affairs od workings (of God, Nature, Schience); 
3. Some fact, affair, design, action, etc. the knowledge' 
of which is kept to oneself or shared only with those whom is 
concerns or to whom it has been confided, something that cannot 
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be divulged without violation of a command or breach of confidence. 
According to the firet definition the secret corresponds to an 
object beside the bounds of knowing. The secret exists as a real 
object and it expresses a negative epistemological attitude. In this 
sense we deal with the secret as an epistemological phenomenon the 
cause of which has still been undiscovered. Then the secret is not 
a linguistic but rather a scientific probleat though language cannot 
be wholly excluded, for all our understanding is closely related to 
speaking: there is no problem untill we consider a thing secret 
that is totally unknown; but as soon as we obtain the slightest 
information on it we name it although we know nothing of its cause 
but its being; then the epistemological problem becomes a linguistic 
one, too. for how can you name a thing without knowing the very 
essence of its existence? Still the solution remain scientific. 
So we cannot say we know a thing unless we have got the necessary 
information on its oause, for knowing its existence generally is 
not enough. 2 According to the third definition the secret corresponds 
to a way of communication; it describes a situation in which the 
contact between potential addressers and addressees is prohibited. 
We can add other cases when the break-down of contact is not 
intentional: the addresser and the addressee cannot get into touch 
because of reasons of time-and-space; or there is contact but 
somehow they don't speak the same language and so they cannot 
understand each other. In this sense we deal with the secret as 
a linguistic phenomenon. 
So we have two clear-cut definitions of "secret": 
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a.) the first refers to an epistomological attitude, to a relation 
between things and human consciousness. Here we could like to lay 
emphasis on "human consciousness" because we hold strongly the 
view that the secret can never be an attribute of things or a 
label attached to them by the human mind; neither can it be a 
type of behaviour sanctioned by conventions; briefly, it is not 
an entity but a system of relations; 
b.) the second definition refers to a type of communication; in 
this sense it is less tempting to think of secret as an ontological 
entity than from an epistomological point of view. For it is not 
the knowledge but the divulgation of it that matters; not the 
information in itself but the fact that it is kept from others. 
So this type of communication will be describable in terms of those 
who keep the information to themselves and of those from whom it 
is kept; i. e. in terms of potential addressers and addressees. 
We aim at giving a general and unified description of secret. 
This description is based on the two different definitions given 
above: according to them the secret is a system consisting of 
certain rules and conditions that orientates our activity to 
acquire knowledge. But communication and knowing cannot be 
separated; so we shall use the word "communication" in a wider 
sense: we consider every activity of the individual to get new 
information as a type of communication - allowing that in some 
cases the addresser remain unknown or be not a definite person 
but a thing, Nature, Fate or a social institute, etc. From this 
it is to be concluded that in a more specific description of 
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secret the interest would be shifted onto the code - especially 
in the case of literature and of complex social phenomena, when 
not only human language but other symbolic languages like the 
language of gestures, things, etc. could serve as a code. In 
some way or other the concept of secret always refers to a system 
of codes whether open or dosed. We speak of a system of codes 
because the same secret can be reformulated in another code which, 
being a meta-language, can have the previous one as an object-
language . 
The secret can be described in terms of two systems: the one 
is to be called a system of epistemological conditions and the 
other a system of rules of communication. It is useful to deal 
with them separately for the epistemological conditions have to 
be satisfied before the rules of communication may come into 
operation; i. e. the epistemological conditions are presupposed 
in the rules of communication. This may serve as a framework of 
a general description of the two different definitions. 
2. Secret as a System of Epistemological Conditions 
In this section we shall try to set down some modal conditions 
of the function of secret. But because these conditions are strongly 
related to the operating of the rules, of communication even the 
modal logical analysis must be completed with respect to some 
social aspects of the problem. This means that modality should be 
seen from the point of view of not one single individual but of a 
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whole coaaunity. We do not exclude the case when it is an 
individual who seeks to know but we have to concede that anyone 
from the coaaunity to which the above-mentioned individual belongs 
may Join in the search. So the secret can function only in a 
community: this community does not correspond always to the society; 
we consider a community every association of people with a certain 
purpose and so with a definite system of norms which will help any 
of the members of the coaaunity in deciding the truth-value of a 
piece of information in the case of verification being hindered 
somehow. Sometimes this system which holds the community together 
strongly may change an already verified value into its opposite 
(see religion). According to the character of this system different 
types of coamunity can be given: religious, political communities, 
communities of sports and clubs, etc. each of which has got a 
specific system of norms for deciding the truth-value of information: 
ravelation or initiation, the present structure of power, different 
normative systems of rules, etc. The modal logical analysis of 
secret can be made only with respect to these syateo& because the 
function of secret involves the epistemological attitude of not 
one single individual but of at least two and at most three. These three 
epistemological attitudes i. e. modal contexts, will have the same 
piece of information, the same known fact, in their scope; but the 
truth-value of this - within the framework of the theory - cannot 
be defined. So our analysis has to be restricted to cases when to 
each triad of modal contexts we can give a relative system of norms 
with respect of which each piece of information acquires a positive 
truth-value in spite of having a negative one outside the community: 
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e. g. if the secret means the knowing or not-knowing of a 
certain miracle it is to be considered true because within the 
community every member of it thinks it so and we are concerned 
with their modal attitudes being the very meaning of secret and 
not with what they know which has got nothing to .to with the 
concept of secret. 
And now we turn to the three modal contexts. In the following 
lines instead of information we shall speak of statements this 
stateaent refers to a fact or to the cause of a fact which we 
accept as true within a certain community. Furthermore we consider 
only the cases when a given £ statement can be formulated as f(x). 
Then x is a bound variable into which we can substitute proper 
names; for these latter we use the symbol <1, which is a logical 
constant, while the possibility of substitution is expressed as 
x/d. Per definitionea f(x) corresponds to the minimal information 
on the existence of the object, while f(d) stands for the adequate 
information on its cause. ' If p = f(x) is a statement, then it can 
function as secret within a certain community and there can be 
defined three different modal contexts all of whioh will have j> 
in their scope; all the contexts will have the modality of "know" 
/K/ with 11, £ and £ in the iniex; 
(i.) let a stand for those and only for those individuals who 
know about a secret in a given community but they don't know the 
solution to it; they know f(x) but they don't know f(d); e. g. 
they know that x robbed the bank but they don't know that x is 
the Oreat Ben; 
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(i.i.) let t> stand for those and only Tor those individuals 
who know about a secret in a given community and they also know 
the solution to it; so they know f(d) too; e. g. ifrp = x 
1 r 1 killed the president and x = Great Ben, thea t> can make the 
following statement: "I know that Great Ben killed the president"; 
(i.i.i.) finally let stand for those and only for those 
individuals who don't know about a secret in a given community; 
so they don't know even f(x); e. g. they don't know that somebody 
killed the president. 
In terms of a, and _£ all the members of the community 
can be defined. The only problem seems to be x/d i. e. quanti-
fication in a modal context. Quantification is based upon identity. 
This problem is extensively dealt with by J. Hintikka in his book 
"Knowledge and Belief". ^ His answer to the problem of quantificttion 
in a referentially opaque and transparent context can be summed 
up in that the two types of quantification lead to the same 
result and that thourh ¡a may know one of two expressions 
referentially identical, this does not mean that he has got all 
the evidence to know the other one too unless he knows the identity 
itself - even if this identity holds true in reality. So if we 
have a £ statement that can be reformulated as f(x), then the 
substitution of £ for x is consistent only if 1» knows x = 
Otherwise a can only know of the-possibility of the substitution. 
And this is really the difference between & (i.) and £ (i.i.). 
This can be shown by writing p/(x/d) instead of f(x) and p/(x*d) 
instead of f(d). Now we can formulate the three modal contexts 
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0 a)(3*J [ r pA/d) &~ K p/x = d) ] el cl 
( i)(3x) [ ̂ p A / d ) & ^p/x =» d) ] 
e c)(3x] t-*cp/{lc/d) Kcp/x - d) ] 
Some epeoial cases need ta be explained: 
b a o: this means that the secret refers to something not known 
by anybody and so the possibility of knowing it is very restricted 
(in the next part we shall see that this case does not conoede 
that the rules of communication come into operation); here may 
belong the situation before a forthcoming discovery or invention, 
etc. This is included in the first definition - i. e. epistemological -
of secret when we lack even the minimal information on an object, 
so we do not know whether it exists (see first part). How we 
can set down one of the main conditions of the function of secret: 
it is to be expected'that there be at least one individual in a 
given community (£) who knows the solution to the secret: b> 1. 
a a o< this Means that one of the basic conditions of secret is 
* 
lacking: on the surface there seems to be no secret because there 
is no-one who could know about without knowing the solution to it, 
too; i. e. these may be only the extreme cases: those who know both 
(¿) and those who know neither of the existence nor the cause (c_). 
But under the surface there may be secrets even the existence of 
which is feared to be known. This is a reduced case with only 
t> and £ but probably a more serious case; although to analyse it 
further ve should have special detectors to search for truth either 
in people's minds or in things but we are not concerned with truth 
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but with the divulgation of it and so we cannot investigate this 
problem further. 
c • b: this means that there is no-one who does not know at least 
about the secret itself: this is rather a final situation in the 
genesis of a secret than one at the beginning of it (see further). 
But the relative position of a., £ and £ may change from one 
moment to another i. e. with the st&rting of communication a 
given individual may shift from a position corresponding to a to 
that of b. This process may increase with the passing of time. The 
communication, which starts his process, is governed by rules 
which will be stated in the following part. But for a description 
of the epistemological conditions we have to prevent any of the 
individuals having the relative position of b or e from acquiring 
any new information from any kind of source. So we can conclude that 
the epistemological conditions are very time-related. 
These conditions can be summed up in one: 
(3 a) ( 3b) ( 38) (3 x) {[ Kap/(x/d J 4 ~ Kap/(x = d)] & 
& [ Kbp/(x/d) & K.p/(d=x)] k [ ~Kcp/( x/d) 6 ~ Kcp/(x=dJ)} 
Still, the only problem seems to be whether we have to 
include the subsistence of JJ in our conditions or not| the concept 
of knowledge recquires it, but many timet the system of norms that 
holds together the community is against it and even "lies" are 
raised to the level of truth. A possible solution to this 
problem may be the introduction of alternative worlds. This 
is based upon Hintikka's work. 6 If we presume that n stands for 
t 
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a possible state of affairs i. e. ^ consists of statements that 
describe this state of affairj, then in this world ^ there can be 
made the following two statements - with respect to our restrictions 
of & and _b consistently: a.) "a does not know that t>". These 
statements will be true only if there is a possible state of affairs 
relative to which j> will be true. But this latter state of affairs 
need not coincide with the previous one relative to which we have 
made the two statements. So this world in which £ is true can be 
called - with respect to a and b - an alternative to ^ which we 
write ̂  *. Then the e->istemolo ;ical condition of sacret may be 
reformulated in the following was: 
If (30(3x)[ Kap/( x/d) & ~Kap/(x * d)] G (l , and 
(3b)(3*)[ Kbp/(x/d) & Kbp/(x = d)] 6 M 
and £ c)(3 3c)~ K p/( x/d)t;tl and if n * with respect to c 
a, l> and £ - is an alternative to ^ , then there is a ^ • 
so that (3 x)p(x=d)t n*. 
3. The Rules of Communication 
When defining the epistemological conditions we have seen 
that the secret can never be the equivalent of a given state of 
affairs or of the satements that describe this state of affairs 
(e. g.^x) (x killed ths president) but only with its reformulation 
within a modal context (e. g. (3*,) ^ b ) K^/* killed the president/'). 
The emphasis of modality is very important because it corresponds 
to what has been said in the first part: the secret cannot be 
considered an entity but the system of rules and conditions that 
govern the human activity to acquire knowledge and to communicate. 
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This governing mechanism is being analyzed now. 
The epistemological conditions are needed for the communication 
of the secret: if b 5 o we cannot speak about communication but 
rather about a philosophical cognitive process. Though if we use 
the word "code" in a wider sense so that it includes the language 
jf all those things, phenomena, gestures, etc. that can function 
as signs if we presume that there be a potential addresser 
communicating in each of these symbolic languages - we can define 
"communication" in a much wider ssnse according to which every 
human cognitive proce is can be a type of communication and so can 
have at least ; virtual addresser while the addressee is man. I.i 
this aspect the epistemological conditions and the rules of 
communication are strongly related to each other: every condition 
determines the possibility of applicable rules. 
If we use instead of the free variables _b and c_ the 
corresponding classes A. B. and C, two different, schemes of 
communication can be given: 
(i.) ADDRESSES = A or B; MESSAGE = ( :;<x) p/(x/d); ADDRESSEE 
(i.i.) ADDRESSER = B; MESSAGE = (gx) p/(x=d); 
ADDRESSEE = A or C. 
The first scheme i:-. important for the function of secret 
in a given community because it incrsases the number of those 
who know about the secret but do not know.the solution to it. So 
this rule tends to convert the elements of C into A. The second 
schene is j.mp,-rtant for the annihilation of the secret in a given 
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community because it increases the number of those who not only 
know about it but also know the solution to it. This rule tends 
to convert the elements of A or C into B. 
Further rules can be specified by restricting the numbers 
of the elements of classes A, B and C; we have seen that B = o 
refers to the epistemological definition of secret with A > o: 
the minimal information received and with A = o: the object 
totally unknown; then B / o r»fers to the other definition of 
secret that describes a type of communication; without this we 
lack one of the basic conditions of the communication of the 
secret; and then B = 1 is a border-line (see secrets of diaries) -
with A = o. And so on, every set of rules presupposes the existence 
of the given epistemological conditions; and vice versa: every 
epistemological conditions; and vice versa: every epistemological 
condition specifies a set of possible rules some of which may 
come into operation with respect to the other conditions. 
So, in abstract, the basic rule of the function of secret 
prescribes that the first type of communication (i.) be open 
while the second (i.i.) be closed. 
Finally the conditio.is and rules of the function of secret 
could summed up thus: if there is given a state of affairs*there 
should be found individuals who do not know the cause of its 
existence nor its existence itself (classes A or C). This is a 
very general criterion. Otherwise we should have a world in 
which everyone's knowledge would be absolute for all men would 
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know all the things that are or that happen. Then a theory of secret 
would be useless. But in our world the human cognitive process is 
hindered and limited by the present state of human consciousaess 
and by the structure of power of the given community. 
4. Secret and Literature 
This analysis of secret may have relevance when speaking about 
a narrative text. As we have viewed the secret in a modal context 
which describe.'] a particular state, with every narrative text it 
is possible - even if theoretically - to construct different triads 
of modal contexts. These contexts would describe series of states. 
The difference between two such states would lie in the different 
substitution rules of a, Jb and £ or in the ranges of A, B and C. 
Each change of state would be governed by special rules of communi-
cation: these rules would tell what new configuration of a, b> and 
c is needed to arrive at a new state. This kind of analysis surely 
presupposes that within each state there be fcund some basic 
information, an elementary statement, which will appear in the 
so.ope of the modal contexts of a, t> and £( i. e. this statement 
£ should bear a privileged position in the structure of the text; 
e. g. if there is a text in which figure the two following 
statements: £ a "x has smoked half his oigarette" and £ = killed 
the king", we have to decide which of the two is to be considered 
more important in constructing the given state. There can be found 
a context in which £ will be decisive; in ordinary life really this is 
more probable. But there can be found another context in which j® will 
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be needed for constructing the given state, i. e. we will have 
to analyse £ in the modal context of a, t> and £. With literary 
texts this is the nore probable. Moreover, it is possible that 
the equality p = q is recquired. It might be that the reader only 
knows this equality; then a, b and £ would stand for readers of 
diverse sensibility who have understood the passage on various 
levels. So an equality as such would function as secret not 
within the book but outside it, just for the readers. 
But for constructing these states we can apply not only to-
thé statements that figure in a given text but to the information 
conveyed by things, gestures, etc. which form part of the world 
of the text, too. So the analysis would shift from the linguistic 
code of the text onto its implicit, symbolical codes and the 
statements formulated on these languages would have to be utilized 
in choosing the modal contexts of <1, b_ and £. So these statements 
would obtain a privileged position in the semantical universe of 
the work of art, and certain semantical problems as the message of 
the writer, the key-sentences of the book, etc. could be solved. 
The description of the series of changing states could aim at 
revealing points of conflict for the greater the number of the 
elements of A, the more intense the function of secret becomes 
ani t.he more manifest it is that the solution is the privilege 
of few - the more it is to be expected that the second type of 
communication (i.i.) will cease to be closed. So this may not 
happen within the book itself; the secret may continue functioning 
outside it while the first type of communication is becoming 
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infinitely open, and it i3 the reader who has to find points of 
reference outside the work to break up the closedness of the 
second type of communication. 
Notes 
* James A.H. Murray - Henry Bradely et al. (eds.): The Oxford 
English Dictionary vol. 9* Oxford (1961-2) pp. 357-358 
2 
The problem of taboo conveys this idea: it refers to a thing 
that is sacred and prohibited at once; sacred in that it is 
not known adequately - like things and workings of Nature -
and prohibited in that it is known but feigned to be not 
known - like linguistical taboos in society. 
' See the epistemological definition of secret: f(X) and f(dj 
are parallel to the problem of naming after knowing the 
existence of an object and knowing its cause, too. 
L 
a, b and £ correspond to the three levels of knowledge 
included in the epistemological definition of secret: £ = 
the object totally unknown; a = its existence is know?; 
while t : it is totally known. 
Jaakko Hir.tikka: Knowledge and Belief, Ithaca - London 1 9 6 2 . 
Op. cit. 
7 
1 . e. they cannot get new information and there must be at 
least one individual who can be substituted for a and b. 
